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1.  
 
Philosophical problems  
in the field of the history of science 
 
 History of science and philosophy of science are interrelated despite 
the separation that predominantly occurred in xx th century, at least in cultural 
contexts influenced by the “anglo-saxon” philosophy. But, actually, history of 
science provides a rich field of philosophical problems, and this consideration 
may powerfully help renewing many “standard” considerations of the philosophy 
of science, such as, for instance, the changes and evolutions of scientific theories 
and representations, to take only one example, but which has been significantly 
related with the structural or systemic character of these theories or 
representation, with known consequences from the “impossibility solutions” 
(claimed for rationality) on the debates about the social aspects of science. If, 
instead, history and rational concerns are to be taken together in considering, 
both philosophically and historically, the problem of scientific changes, then the a 
priori impossibility shows no more relevant, as the existence of changes is taken 
as factual, and we have to think deeper to understand how they occur.  
 Also, the question of the relation between rationality (preferably to a 
pure logical concern) and invention or discovery in science could be more 
adequately considered by taking true historicized science, which is that on which 
scientists do work, than his “rational reconstructions” (see, for instance, what a 
“problem”, or a “difficulty” is, for a scientist at work, in a given case study). In 
particular, the epistemologico-historical concepts of “scientific style”, of 
“scientific programme”, of “scientific tradition” ([1990]), that express a diversity 
of possible (legitimate) approaches for a same kind of object or of problem in a 
given time, are useful to understand how science is always in the making and is 
never already given (be it potentially) or “natural”, as if there were a unique 
standard response or statement to a only one-way formulable question.  
 Clearly, such a concept as “objectivity” is doomed to be reconsidered 
in these circumstances, and other fundamental concepts and categories as well. 
But this does not mean that they would have to be left out, and that one would 
have to adopt a purely historicist conception of knowledge and adhere to a “strong 
relativist” conception with social reductionism, or to a philosophically nominalist 
position rejecting rational abstraction and generalization. For this would be too 
cheap a position, and would lead to absurd conclusions about science and 
rationality, when, on the contrary, the confrontation of both requirements of real 
or effective science, i.e. its dimensions of knowledge (meaning contents) on the 
one hand and of human practice of knowledge (which includes sociality and 
context-dependence, most often casual), on the other hand, is a worthwhile 
challenge for thought. It is worthwhile, because only from it can we expect to get 
at some sound, exact and balanced signification about science, scientific activity 
and rational contents. 
 We could make an inventory of such items of the kind. The question 
of the “interpretation” itself can be differently seen when it is shifted from a 
purely logical point of view (as if there was one given compelling interpretation, 
in the philosophical sense), up to a circumstancial, i.e. rational-and-contingent one 
(see, for example, the importance of the historically situated cultural context for 
the acceptation of the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum 
mechanics).  
 For all this, and furthermore, history of science, by making know 
historical facts about science, i.e. the actual reality of science, as a human, 
intellectual and social activity considered in the historical time, appears as being 
essential in knowing better what science is. Philosophy of science can no more 
ignore this knowledge and stand within an abstract idealization of science (after 
all, such an idealization has been historically coined and its knowledge is history 
dependent). We must admit, symmetrically, as accepted (even if not by 
everybody) that history of science (as history itself) is not merely description of 
events, nor with purely social concern, and that it has to do with meanings that 
have to be searched for (they, too, are not immediately given), which implies the 
use of reasoning, including epistemological analysis, and at least some 
philosophical reflections on what all this is about.  
 
 
2.  
 
the Anthropological Approach of Science considered through a variety of 
historical conditions  
and cultural diversity  
 
 The taking into account by history of science, since a few decades, of 
the variety of the historical conditions (in space and time) under which science 
has emerged, has developed or has transformed, corresponds to one of the major 
aspects of the thema “Science and cultural diversity”. This “œcumenical” 
widening of history of science entails new perspectives for the philosophical 
approach of problems related with science - in an enlarged, dynamical and diverse 
conception of science. 
 To reflect on science and cultural diversity means : 
 
1. To consider many possible interrelations between science and cultural aspects, 
essentially from a contemporaneous point of view. Clearly, our views on these 
problems are affected by the fact that we situate ourselves in the context of 
modern science in the present world, even if from some diversity of origins. Most 
of our categories are rooted in this context. Internationalism and mundialization 
are our present. But we can always inquire their modalities and their roots, now 
and in history, and we can reflect also on the lessons of other cultural systems in 
the history of civilizations, that include forms of knowledge that can be seen as 
corresponding to what we call science. And we are thus led to point 2. 
 
2. To see science as an aspect of the various cultures considered according to 
their diversity in time and space. The problem is to identify what “science” is in 
each culture, and to analyse its relations with the other culturals components. In 
such an inquiry, we cannot start from “science” in general, for it would mean to 
impose an external philosophical scheme onto a given cultural representation ; 
but we should try to identify which activities (and objects and methods) are to be 
pertinently compared to what we consider as “scientific” (from our own 
questioning), so as to be qualified as such, though knowing however that there 
are different systemic meanings for knowledge in different cultures. In doing that, 
we should assume that some communication  is somewhat possible and 
meaningful between different “cultural systems”. It entails some changes in the 
possible definitions of science.  
 Note that there would be similar problems to define art  as aethetics 
from the produced objects and forms that we appreciate as such, and for other 
cultural components as well. Anyhow, if we want to go further than describing 
mere facts or local situations, and try some deep understanding of them, and of 
their meaning, culturally speaking, be it from a simple anthropological point of 
view, we need to use some categories such as science, technique, religion, art, 
aesthetics, philosophy, reasoning, meaning, etc., even if we must be ready to find 
that they are not uniquely and rigidly defined since the start.  
 We could therefore even consider that they are our creations (as well 
as the notion of history is our creation, I mean the creation of a given culture), but 
they are useful to enlighten what cultural forms are, and we can even ask 
ourselves from which more complex cultural forms they have been constituted 
(and separated by our minds). We should consider in this respect the eventual 
status of general and abstract knowledges and of general and abstract categories, 
as well as the reflexive thought about these, in various situations of cultural 
diversity (through comparative studies). And inquire about the communication 
(as possibility and as modalities) respectively of concrete elements of knowledge 
and of abstract ones.  
 
 
 3.  
 
Philosophical problems  
 of science and cultural diversity 
 
 On this background, let me formulate some questions of a 
philosophical nature that would come out afresh from the study of such historical 
situations. We may consider that they concern the intellectual conditions of 
possibility of science and cultural diversity or, in other words, that they point at 
philosophical problems emerging from the field of historical facts about science 
and culture. The following evocation is far from being exhaustive and serve 
merely as indications and suggestions for further inquiry. 
 
1. - Are there general categories  (from our historical and epistemological 
analyse) compatible with diversity ? In particular, what is the status of 
universality, of rationality, of reason, and even of common sense ? At least some 
common intelligibility within cultural diversity has always been the basis of 
interethnical communication, as testified by many reports by travellers through 
centuries ; this having to be tempered by the frequent occurrence of 
misunderstandings, of only partial understandings, and of lack of communication 
as well… Also, reasoning, despite differences in the definitions or premisses, is a 
common faculty of human beings, as wordly testified. Universality, which is at 
odds with uniformity and uniqueness, shows to be an adequate category when 
one looks at anthropological and historical facts such as ability to language, to 
symbolic representation, to social life, to technical realizations, to the invention 
of forms, ideas and organizations (social one, in particular), to knowledge in 
general : see the “neolithic revolution”,  the invention and dissemination of 
writing, the industrial revolution, not to speak of science, for our ultimate 
question is : how (in which sense) can we speak of the universality of science ? 
(See Paty [1997, 1999]). 
 
2. - What are the modalities of the transmissions of knowledges, either inside a 
cultural tradition or through different ones, and are there useful epistemological 
concepts or categories able to give account of them ? In this respect, I would 
oppose to the kuhnian notion of “paradigm” another one that seems much more 
appropriate from the point of view of history of science that includes the 
consideration of cultural diversity, and less philosophically biased, such as that of 
inheritance (of styles or traditions or programmes about knowledge), that leaves 
all space for creative activity. A “normative conception” would admit creative 
activity only as an accident or through a revolution, although scientific creativity 
appears to be not extraordinary or “a-normal”, but inherent to science as 
formation of new knowledge, with or without scientific revolutions, the latter 
being by definition exceptional.  
 
3. - Is the notion of structural incommensurability (of the conceptual 
representations) of some relevance when we must consider that, communication 
being historically evidenced, communicability is possible and factual ? On the 
other hand, historical understanding needs to respect the systems of meanings of 
the “cultures” considered, which are, at a given state in time, governed by their 
structurations. This means that we have to relativize the concept of 
incommensurability for structures in order to let space for communicability. 
Actually, it is absolute only in an axiomatic acception, when one considers 
conceptual meanings as fully closed inside theories or representations, but it is 
not really adequate with respect to the historical point of view on conceptual 
elaborations. The idea of “systemic character” is for sure an interesting one from 
the historical point of view, when one considers the questions of meaning in 
knowledge transmissions, but it cannot be identified to incommensurability in the 
strict sense. This should be developed and enriched with epistemological analysis 
of exemples taken in the history of science, particularly of transmissions through 
cultural diversity. 
 
4. - What is the interplay between intelligibility and historicity ? This question 
leads inevitably to that of the transformations (and widenings) of rationality, and 
to that of the nature of such transformations [forthcoming, a]. 
 
5. - What can be said about such notions as problematization, demonstration, 
proof, etc., when confronted to the various conceptions of science ? (There are 
investigations on some of these problems that are already published or in the 
course of publication). 
 
6. - The problem of knowledge's communication and of translation, that often 
entails inadequacies (“traduttore, tradittore”), leads also to that of invention as a 
possible consequence (although it is not the only way to invention, according to 
what we have stated above on creativity : through the translation and assimilation 
process alone it would be more accidental and casual). How does this happen in 
relation with the insertion of science in cultural contexts ? (this question joins 
again that one considered above about the relations between changes of 
interpretations and contents). 
 
 There are, of course, many other possible items… Note that 
philososophical questions of this kind may lead to historical investigations in the 
form of case studies or of comparative researches, as historical facts are essential, 
in our perspective, to situate these questions and to test their possible answers (as 
we have experienced elsewhere with the problem of universality of science 
[1997, 1999]). 
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